Solutions to Japanese Economic Problems by unknown
Japan’s decade of economic underperformance and malaise appears to be com-
ing to an end. The economy is experiencing its third round of recovery, this time
without the marked use of fiscal stimuli. Is this, in fact, a “genuine recovery?” Does
the Japanese public, as well as the business sector, perceive the recovery as real?
Has structural reform addressed the problems confronting Japan sufficiently for a
real recovery to continue? What problems persist even if recovery proceeds? What
policy prescriptions are being utilized by Japanese policymakers and business
leaders? Are they appropriate? What is being overlooked? Are we operating under
any misconceptions regarding current and future economic conditions and
trends? What lessons can be learned from the experiences of other advanced
economies? This symposium endeavors to answer these questions, tackling two
major themes: Japan’s macroeconomic policy issues, including both monetary
policy and the long-run fiscal sustainability of the Japanese budget; and the
reform of Japan’s banking system and government financial institutions. 
On June 21, 2004, the Center on Japanese Economy and Business of Columbia
University and the Research Center for Advanced Science and Technology of the
University of Tokyo sponsored a symposium focusing on the theoretical approaches
of macroeconomics to Japan’s recession at Roppongi Academy Hills Auditorium in
Tokyo, Japan. The symposium brought together academics, business leaders, and
public officials from both the United States and Japan in order to ensure a com-
prehensive approach to the resolution of the problems confronting the Japanese
economy today. This report represents excerpts of the symposium, accompanied by
highlights of exchanges with the audience that day. 
Solutions to Japanese Economic Problems
C E N T E R  O N  J A PA N E S E  E C O N O M Y  A N D  B U S I N E S S    J U N E  2 0 0 4
2 Solutions to Japanese Economic Problems 
OPENING REMARKS
HUGH PATRICK
Director, Center on Japanese
Economy and Business
Today we focus on twomajor themes. The first is
Japan’s macroeconomic policy
issues, notably monetary pol-
icy, and the fiscal sustainability
of the Japanese budget in the
long run as the population
ages. The second is the reform
of the Japanese banking system
and of government financial
institutions.
Our project addresses other
important themes as well: capi-
tal markets, the life insurance
industry, business investment
and corporate restructuring,
labor markets, and the political
economy of trade policy and
free trade agreements (FTAs).
In addition, we have concen-
trated on looking at some of
the lessons for U.S. policymak-
ers from Japanese monetary
and fiscal policies. 
This project has involved 15
outstanding Japanese and
American economists and
scholars, who have collabo-
rated to prepare 10 substantive,
analytical papers with clear-cut
policy recommendations. Our
goal is to contribute to the dis-
cussion of these policy issues in
the public policy debate in
Japan, and to enhance under-
standing abroad of these
important issues, both in
America and in other countries.
To highlight this project, we
will publish academic books in
both English and Japanese. 
Of course, we are
delighted that the economy
has been doing so well in the
past six months, even in the
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past year. In a sense, it means
that the policy conclusions and
recommendations that we have
been making are even more
important. As the economy
does better, it is easier to over-
come some of the economy’s
continuing diff i c u l t i e s .
H o w e v e r, if the fundamental
p roblems are not attacked, we
a re somewhat doubtful that
the current good gro w t h
p rospect will be self-sustaining
in the long run. That is my
own judgment—each of the
p roject participants has a dif-
f e rent judgment on this. My
personal feeling is that Japan is
close to being in a self-sustain-
i n g - g rowth phase, but it is not
t h e re yet—and this is the
w rong time to be relaxed and
complacent. Continuing policy
e fforts are necessary to solve
the problems that remain; they
will not be solved simply by
continued economic recovery. 
KAZUHITO HASHIMOTO
Director, Research Center of
Advanced Science and
Technology, University of Tokyo
It has been said that theJapanese economy has lost
an entire decade. How can
Japan’s economic problems be
solved? This is a subject of
intense discussion among
Japanese and American schol-
ars. Based on the policies
prescribed in these papers, this
conference will be helpful in
facilitating understanding of the
issues, both in the public and
private sector. This conference
encompasses both Japanese
and American perspectives, in
order to have a comprehensive








Chairman, Japan Association of
Corporate Executives (Keizai
Doyukai)
Is growth of the Japaneseeconomy sustainable? Last
week, I attended the Asian ver-
sion of the World Economic
Forum in Seoul. The greatest
point of concern among the
attendees of that conference
was the recovery shown by the
Japanese economy—whether it
is real or not. A year ago, there
was not much interest in the
Japanese economy, but now
interest is returning. This is the
third round of economic recov-
ery. In the previous two
rounds, public spending stimu-
lus was used, but it was not
this time, and so, perhaps, now
we can say that Japan’s econ-
omy is making a real recovery. 
We have surveyed Japanese
entrepreneurs. Last year, 2 per-
cent of the respondents said
that the Japanese economy 
was expanding. By March 
2003, Japanese companies
announced increases in both
profit and sales, but not many
Japanese entrepreneurs felt that
the Japanese economy was
actually expanding. Since then,
we have seen rising stock
prices in Japan. Also, including
pension fund management and
as in terms of balance sheets,
there has been a positive
impact. Gross domestic product
(GDP) indicators have also
improved. Rapid recovery was
made from September through
December 2003, so that in
terms of March and June 2004,
many entrepreneurs in Japan
are saying that they think the
economic expansion is in fact
genuine. 
Personal consumption
accounts for 60 percent of the
Japanese GDP, and it has been
showing improvement; on an
annual basis, there has been 3-
4 percent growth in consumer
spending. So it may be that
individual spending is improv-
ing a bit, although real income
has not gone up that much
recently in Japan. However, if
you look at personal financial
holdings, stocks represent
about 5 percent, and more than
50 percent is in the form of sav-
ings and deposits. People have
not gone into stock investment.
They are not willing to take
risks. That is the situation in
which we remain. It has been a
long-standing issue and has not
yet improved. Individuals have
started to take part in the trad-
ing of stocks, but stock holding
has not really taken root. In
terms of direct investment, not
much money has come in here
either.
Japan has the second
largest GDP in the world, so a
single prescription is not
enough to generate a full
recovery of the Japanese econ-
omy. There are many pending
issues. First is the large fiscal
deficit. Another is the falling
fertility rate, which is an issue
for all of Asia; it has fallen to
1.29, and the population is
aging rapidly. Then there is
concern about international
competitiveness. According to
an IMD study, Japan ranks 9th
out of 30 major countries in this
area. There are concerns specif-
ically about labor productivity.
Some manufacturers show very
high figures, but on average, it
Japan has the second
largest GDP in the
world, so a single
prescription is not
enough to generate a
full recovery of the
Japanese economy.
—Kakutaro Kitashiro
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is low. The financial system in
Japan also faces problems. The
combined debt of the local and
the national governments is 150
percent of the GDP. Clearly, the
Japanese situation is worsening
rapidly. Other countries are
also seeing their situation wors-
ening, but they are making
more effort to combat it. In
terms of the GDP, the U.S. fiscal
deficit is 7–8 percent, while the
European is about 3 percent,
thanks to the countries’ reme-
dial efforts. 
At the World Economic
Forum conference, one non-
Japanese attendee said that the
Japanese fiscal position cannot
recover, and the only way out
for Japan is to have inflation.
Japan is now likely to have a
very large inflation. An econo-
mist made that statement, and
economists are now responsi-
ble for the management of the
economy. They have the free-
dom to say anything they like,
and it does not mean much if
their guesses turn out to be
wrong. However, that is not the
case for entrepreneurs like our-
selves, who have to take
responsibility when economists’
p redictions are wrong. We 
need to recognize the problems
and act. We have had a great
deal of action vis-à-vis the reso-
lution of nonperforming loans
(NPL) and others. I hope this
continues. 
With regard to the birthrate,
it has become so low that it is
really difficult to expect much
improvement in the short run.
How we can have sustainable
pension funds is a major issue.
We have seen a slight improve-
ment in competitiveness (e.g.,
the IMD World Competitiveness
Yearbook). What about institu-
tions of higher education?
Japan ranked 30th out of the 30
major countries for the contri-
butions made by the higher
educational institutions to the
Japanese economy. Further,
when we examined entrepre-
neurship and corporate
governance, Japan ranked very
low. We cannot be complacent
about Japan’s number nine
position. Based on the
Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development
(OECD) figures and the graph
by McKinsey, which looks at
primary industries, Japan ranks
11th. Productivity is very low in
Japan for agriculture and other
sectors. 
What about manufacturing?
Japan scored 93, while the
United States scored 100, which
is not bad. If you look at manu-
facturers with good export
competitiveness (for example,
the automobile, digital appli-
ance, and steel-making
industries), the score is actually
120, which is ahead of the
United States. The overall man-
ufacturing competitiveness is
about 93, nonetheless. 
What about the service
industry? Sixty percent of the
people in Japan are employed
in services, but productivity for
the service industry is 61,
which is very low. Many busi-
nesses are highly regulated.
Much improvement is needed
here. 
Looking ahead, what steps
should we take? Until recently,
after the bubble economy
burst, it was said that we expe-
rienced a “lost decade.” Under
Prime Minister Koizumi, we are
seeing many re f o rms, particularly
with regard to nonperforming
loans. According to the prime
minister, there is no economic
growth without structural
reform. The NPL disposal is a
thing of the past. We have to
consider what we should do in
the coming decade. While it is
painful, we must continue
implementing structural reform.
Companies that are weak can-
not go through restructuring. 
In order to restructure, there
should be fiscal and financial
backup to support the weaker
companies, as well as a 
greater sense of urgency for
restructuring.
I think the Japanese econ-
omy has had a sense of crisis
since the bubble economy
burst, but now Japanese busi-
nesses are gaining more
p o w e r, so it is time to imple-
ment structural re f o rms to
help the economy re c o v e r,
and we need to sustain the
momentum. Reforms in the
public and private sectors—
privatization, dere g u l a t i o n —
a re important. Also, govern-
m e n t - a ffiliated financial
institutions, particularly the
postal savings system, have to
be re f o rmed. We need to
re f o rm fiscal investment and
loan programs as well, and a
shift has to be made from state
to region. Social security
re f o rm must be made sustain-
able, and medical insurance
and pension re f o rms are
needed as well. Tax re f o rm ,
primary balance surplus, and
fiscal reconsolidation are also
important. The govern m e n t
has targeted 2013 as its date
for fiscal reconsolidation, but
a set path toward that end has
not yet been defined. What
specific government measure s
a re needed to achieve this 10-
year program? We should also
try to move away from export
Now Japanese busi-
nesses are gaining











We need entre p reneurs to
start up new businesses. We
need to have enterprising peo-
ple generate innovation in the
economy and in business. We
need that kind of mechanism,
that environment. to grow fur-
ther as a nation. We also need
educational re f o rm. If we carry
out educational re f o rm today,
the effects will come only later,
so we need to have a long-
t e rm perspective, targeting 10,
20, 30 years ahead, in order to
carry it out. British Prime
Minister Tony Blair has stated
as his priorities: “First, educa-
tion; second, education; and
third, fourth, and fifth are
again education.”
Various approaches to
reform are possible. In the case
of the United Kingdom, the
Ministry of Education allocates
funds for decentralization.
Therefore, each individual
school has an initiative to
improve academically. Testing
provides needed assessment.
An inspection system has also
been introduced, where inspec-
tors visit schools to assess the
results of the reforms. 
We at the Keizai Doyukai
have also studied Finland. In
contrast to the UK, Finland
does not conduct nationwide
scholastic tests. The govern-
ment creates an overall policy.
The curriculum and textbooks
are selected by each school, in
each region. Decentralization is
promoted to give more power
to regional teachers. This is
approach is being adopted in
Japan, as well. This year, the
universities have become inde-
pendent organizations.
However, in Japan there is a
large gap between what is
being advocated and what is
actually happening. In the case
of Finland, teachers of primary
and secondary schools have
master’s degrees. We must also
try to educate Japan’s teachers
further. Parents should be more
involved, as well.
With regard to new ven-
t u res, Silicon Valley in the
United States is famous for its
many start-up businesses.
Many nations want to encour-
age their own “Silicon Va l l e y . ”
In order to support entre p re-
neurs, Singapore’s government,
for example, has created a
v e n t u re fund. It is a sort of
matching fund—if there is pri-
vate sector investment, the
g o v e rnment will provide an
equivalent amount of funds.
Ve n t u res can make investment
in govern m e n t - d e s i g n a t e d
a reas. If losses occur, they can
be compensated by the gov-
e rnment with a deduction fro m
taxable income. Singapore is
also implementing a tax incen-
tive system.
Finland is trying to promote
venture businesses as well.
Before we went to Finland, we
thought that it had many start-
up businesses. However, when
we visited that country, we dis-
covered that the pension
system is well established and
the income tax rate very high.
Therefore, rather than starting
up businesses, people want to
become schoolteachers in order
to reach a certain level of
income. They are very aware
that when they work very hard,
the income tax on their earn-
ings is very high. It is the
predominant mental ity.
Likewise, in Japan, we, too,
have to change social values in
order to stimulate venture busi-
ness. Society needs to honor,
approve of, and support entre-
preneurs. 
Entrepreneurship has to be
instilled in the educational sys-
tem. Of course, scholastic
achievement is very important,
but at the same time, starting a
business is admirable, which
students need to know. Teach-
ers do not have experience
with starting up businesses,
and, therefore, they should per-
haps invite entrepreneurs to
their schools as a stimulus to
the students. 
T h e re are many things that
can be done in Japan in order
to stimulate venture busi-
nesses, which can in turn
stimulate innovation. Of
course, major companies have
a role to play. However, often
major companies come up
with innovations, but because
the innovations do not benefit
the companies directly, they
do not exploit these innova-
tions, which impedes the
innovation process. For 
example, in high-speed com-
munication, we have IP
telephony using ADSL, where
one is always connected to the
network. NTT, however, has a
fixed telephone line, and
those with a fixed line net-
work as an infrastructure do
not want to promote IP
telephony. IP telephony, how-
e v e r, can be promoted by
v e n t u re businesses because
they do not rely on past
investments or old infrastruc-
t u res. This is why venture
innovation is very important. 
At Keizai Doyukai, we con-
ducted a survey on the
challenges facing entrepre-
neurs. The biggest problem is
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funding. It is difficult to get
funds from banks because new
ventures are highly risky.
Personal guarantees are
required of the business own-
ers. Then, should the business
fail, the owners are deprived of
their personal assets, not an
encouraging environment for
entrepreneurs. 
The second biggest prob-
lem is finding customers. Even
should an entrepreneur
develop a new program or
product, there is no ready mar-
ket. Recruiting employees is
another problem. We need to
support venture businesses in
all these difficult areas.
The year 2004 is the new
dawn of the Japanese econ-
omy. It is about to rebound,
and innovation is key to
growth. We should not procras-
tinate. This should be the year
for decision and action.
DISCUSSION 
Q: It is really hard to implement
educational reform. Our univer-
sity is now an independent
agency, but all the funding
comes from the Ministry of
Finance. To get external fund-
ing, we would have to accept a
reduced subsidy from the
Japanese government. What do
you think about that?
Kitashiro: It is the university
itself that is going to be the
promoter of reform, so the
president or the dean of the
university has to be a compe-
tent person. You have to be
very careful about selecting
someone to the top post.
Election by professors may not
be best, because those people
elected by their colleagues tend
to be more conservative. (I am
not talking specifically about
the University of Tokyo.) The
top person needs to be reform
minded. Private sector people
can offer advice, but we need a
competent person at the top
who is willing to go ahead with
reform. I think the mechanism
has been put in place, and so
as long as the president of the
university is willing to under-
take reform, I think that person
will succeed. 
Q : I work at a Silicon Va l l e y
company headquarters. I am
very interested in this issue of
innovation and venture capi-
tal. I think it is pretty clear that
many of the issues that you
discussed, such as funding,
getting customers, and re c r u i t-
ing good people have to do
with risk aversion in Japan.
What is your re c o m m e n d a t i o n
for getting people in Japan to
be less risk averse? In my
Silicon Valley company, the
attitudes, values, and culture
a re completely diff e rent. What
kind of incentives are needed
in Japan? What is your re c o m-
mendation to create an
e n v i ronment that allows for
m o re risk-taking?
K i t a s h i r o : We are talking here
about the values of society or
of the social system. There is a
good reason for Japan not
p roducing many entre p re n e u r s
in the past; it was economi-
cally irrational for Japan! Of
course, you can make money,
but you will not be praised by
society. People get suspicious
if you are too successful. They
will not trust you. That is the
cultural setup of Japanese
society. 
If you are going to start up
a company and you are very
rich, or your parents are rich,
it is okay. If you are not, you
need to rely on loans to start
up a new business. You need
to borrow money from a bank.
Of course, there is the
People’s Finance Corporation,
which could lend you money
with no collateral, but that is
not the usual practice of finan-
cial institutions. You have to
have previous experience, and
you have to have good finan-
cial standing. Otherwise, you
will not be able to get the loan
f rom a bank. An enjo type of
tax incentive needs to be
given in Japan. Also, if there
w e re more success stories,
then people would feel like
emulating the entre p re n e u r s .
M r. Son of Softbank and Mr.
Mikitani of Rakuten are the
only people we can think of
who have become successful
e n t re p reneurs. We need more
good examples so that people
feel like emulating other peo-
ples’ successes. 
Patrick: I appreciate Mr.
K i t a s h i ro’s comprehensive and
insightful comments, espe-
cially his emphasis on
education, education, educa-
tion. Since we are providers of
educational services, we are
particularly appreciative of
that perception. As I heard the
debate about American-style
and Japanese-style venture
capital, I would suggest that
the diff e rences are even
g reater between American-
style and Japanese-style
universities. The problems of
adjustment are going to be
even more difficult because
the market works less well. 
The year 2004 is the
new dawn of the
Japanese economy. It






M AC ROECONOMIC POLICY
TAKATOSHI ITO 
University of Tokyo
For the past year, I havebeen collaborating with
P rofessor Frederic Mishkin of
Columbia University on my
re s e a rch on Japanese mone-
tary policy. I will begin by
reviewing the status of the
deflationary problem. As a
result of deflation, our mone-
tary policy is limited, as you
know. The nominal intere s t
rate comes down to zero, and
at that point in time, monetary
policy cannot be taken
t h rough interest rate man-
agement. These are the
constraints generated by the
z e ro nominal interest rate. As
a result, investment and con-
sumer spending are re s t r a i n e d
as the real interest rate goes
up. Another result of deflation
is that the value of the money
debtors have to repay contin-
ues to rise. There f o re, re a l
indebtedness expands. As a
result, it would seem that
debtors lose and creditors win.
In fact, that is not the situa-
tion, because the debtors’
balance sheet would come
down to nonperf o rming loans,
and they would then go bank-
rupt. Thus, the nonperf o rm i n g
loans issue becomes even
m o re serious. As deflation
lingers, a new nonperf o rm i n g
loan issue arises. This is what
we have been experiencing
for the past few years, a
vicious cycle of deflation, a
deflationary spiral. 
Japan is experiencing a
“deflationary trap.” Let’s exam-
ine the consumer price index
(CPI), excluding food, vis-à-vis
the previous year, along with
the GDP deflator based on the
inflation rate. As you know,
these two lines do not neces-
sarily match all the time
because of technical issues.
Most likely, the real inflation
rate, in this case deflation, can
be found somewhere between
the lines formed by these two
indices. There f o re, the con-
sumer price index being zero
p e rcent does not necessarily
mean the end of deflation.
P e rhaps the CPI has an
upward bias, and, there f o re, a
negative 1 percent deflation
situation is lingering (see Ta b l e
A, below).
In the interest of time, I
will limit my focus to the
period of 1998 and after, when
the new Bank of Japan (BoJ)
law was implemented. In
February 1999, the so-called
“ z e ro interest rate” policy was
i n t roduced. Some say we
should have implemented a
z e ro interest rate policy ear-
l i e r. The condition for the
policy was such that until the
deflationary expectation was
dispelled, the policy would be
in place. In August 2000, the
z e ro interest rate was re m o v e d
because deflationary pre s s u re
was seen to have been elimi-
nated. I think this was a
mistake on the part of the BoJ.
The Information Te c h n o l o g y
(IT) bubble had already burst,
and the U.S. economic re c e s-
sion had begun. Knowing that,
BoJ still removed the zero
i n t e rest rate policy, which was
too early. Then, the zero inter-
est rate was reinstituted, and
quantitative credit easing was
i n t roduced. 
This is a highly accommo-
dative policy. The precondition
for that policy to continue is
that the consumer price index,
excluding food, move above
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tinue to be above zero percent
for several months, and there
was no longer a worry of defla-
tion coming back. Therefore,
the hurdle became higher—
these became the new
conditions. 
In terms of the message
being sent under Governor
Fukui’s regime, in order to fight
deflationary pressure, monetary
policy would remain accom-
modative. A similarly strong
message has been issued by the
new governor. An outright pur-
chase limit has been increased,
and the target amount of the
BoJ was also increased. Since
2001, quantitative easing was
implemented (see Table B). 
Looking at the interest rates,
the thick line on the left of the
table indicates the official dis-
count rate, and the lower line
indicates the call rate. Both are
declining. Since 2001, they
have fallen to a level that can-
not go down further. In terms
of the official discount rate, it
goes below the 0.1 percent
threshold. It is virtually a zero
interest rate. 
What are the re m a i n i n g
p roblems? Since Govern o r
Fukui came into office, the
message has become stro n g e r
and is being communicated to
the market. The Japanese
economy is gradually re c o v e r-
ing. However, we have to see
whether this growth is sustain-
able. Deflation measured in
CPI is coming down to zero
p e rcent or so. However, defla-
tion is not yet over. If
deflation re t u rns, it would lead
to the emergence of new non-
p e rf o rming loans. 
W h e re the interest rate is
z e ro, what are the policy
instruments we can use? First,
we can introduce a price level
t a rget policy, rather than using
the inflation rate. We should
try to reach a certain price
level and tolerate price
i n c reases up to this target. We
would like to exercise pre s-
s u re on Japanese banks. In
order to achieve a price level
t a rget, a nontraditional, non-
conventional monetary policy
can be undertaken. The BoJ
must announce clearly its
intention to do so. 
There are some counterar-
guments. In our view, the most
reasonable concern relates to
the BoJ’s balance sheet, which
may be damaged. Also, the
BoJ’s balance sheet would cre-
ate losses. To deal with this, the
Ministry of Finance could
announce unilaterally that
losses would be compensated
for by the government. This
must be done only on the con-
dition that the price level target
is reached, however.
What is the price level tar-
get, then? Since 1997, the price
level CPI movement has
remained nearly flat, dipping a
n e r. At the time, what this 
stability meant was not 
clarified. 
Between 1998 and 2003, we
analyzed BoJ monetary poli-
cies, because the zero interest
rate was something the BoJ
wanted to eliminate as quickly
as possible. Therefore, the
long-term interest rate was not
actually lowered. Since 2001,
the BoJ purchased long-term
Japanese government bonds
(JGBs) on a larger scale.
However, the BoJ did not
strongly indicate the continua-
tion of the low interest rate
policy in the beginning. The
messages issued by the BoJ
were that deflationary policy
was not necessarily wrong,
and, also, that there were no
other alternatives. I think this
was a policy mistake that pro-
longed the deflationary
pressure. 
Since 2003, quantitative eas-
ing was allocated for and
actively taken. In October of
last year, a stable CPI above
zero percent was more clearly
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little, but growing 1 percent 
per year. We could move to 
target the price level, regardless
of the inflation rate. Once that
t a rget is achieved, we can
switch to the so-called 
“inflation target.” This is our
recommendation. As long as
deflation continues, it will take
longer to reach the price level
target. When undertaking such
a policy, history becomes very
important. In other words, the
longer the BoJ continues to
make a mistake, the longer it
will take for the BoJ to over-
come the situation created by
this mistake. This message is
very important. 
What would be the effect of
using such a policy, by clarify-
ing the target? We can promote
confidence in the market.
Inflation can go above zero
percent for several months, but
that is not enough. We have to
wait for a sustained recovery.
That is the message we can
issue to the market. Then, once
we achieve the price level tar-
get, what should we do? At that
point, the “inflation rate target”
can be adopted, because that
would be easier for the market
to understand in normal times.
Put simply, under deflationary
pressure, we can adopt a price
level target policy, and then
once that target is achieved, we
can switch to an inflation target
policy. 
When we propose a price
level target, people often say
there are no instruments to be
used, but there are, indeed,
several of them. Of course,
these instruments have bad side
effects, so we cannot recom-
mend their use under just any
circumstances, but they can be
employed if necessary. This
stance would send a strong
message to the market. We can
create market expectations by
saying that these policy instru-
ments can be taken when
absolutely necessary. For exam-
ple, we can increase the
purchase of long-term JGBs.
We can also purchase shares
and real estate. 
The BoJ’s quantitative eas-
ing must continue. That is very
important. Several months of
zero percent is too lenient a
condition. Instead, we should
clearly define a price level tar-
get and announce the BoJ’s
commitment to that target. We
can say that public money can
be injected to restore the capi-




I am presenting my jointre s e a rch with Christian
B roda of the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York. I want to
emphasize that these are our
opinions, not those of the
Federal Reserve Bank. Our
re s e a rch grew out of some
work that we were doing on
fiscal sustainability. As many of
you know, economics has
been re f e r red to as the “dismal
science,” so I am pleased to
p rovide you with some happy
news from the “dismal sci-
ence” about Japan’s fiscal
situation. 
There are many reasons
why many people have thought
that it was time to panic when
it came to Japanese bonds.
Japan’s government debt to
GDP ratio is more than 150
percent, close to 200 percent.
We have seen some budget
deficits in the order of 10 per-
cent of GDP or close to that.
There have been discussions
about lower future growth due
to a shrinking labor force. It is
likely that the aging of the pop-
ulation will result in a doubling
of the ratio of public pension
and medical benefit recipients
to the employed. Moody’s
made an announcement that
was shocking in Japan, that it
had downgraded Japanese pub-
lic debt to a level below that of
Botswana and various other
developing countries. 
I have often felt that there
was something wrong with
this story. In particular, a big
outlier has been the perf o rm-
ance of the Japanese bond
market. If you think about a
fiscal crisis that affects the
bond market, you would think
that there should be one of
two impacts. First—that the
g o v e rnment might default on
its debt—second, that the gov-
e rnment would be forced to
print money in order to cover
its obligations, what is called,
in economics, “monetizing the
debt.” If you believe that one
of these two things is going to
happen, you would also think
that the yield on long-term
g o v e rnment bonds should be
higher today in order to com-
pensate bondholders for
f u t u re expected losses, due
either to inflation or default.
Now, we come to inconven-
ient facts that arise if you are
very worried about a fiscal cri-
sis in Japan. 
In 2003, the yield on the
newly issued 20-year Japanese
g o v e rnment bond fluctuated
between 0.8 and 1.9 perc e n t .
The yield on a 10-year bond
moved between 0.5 and 1.5
p e rcent. You might think this
Moody’s had down-
graded Japanese
public debt to a 
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is just the opinion of a few
Japanese bond traders, but, if
you look at the size of the
Japanese government bond
market, you realize that it is a
p retty big market. The market
in 2001 was ¥172 trillion,
which is about 34 percent of
the Japanese GDP. So, another
way of thinking about the cur-
rent situation is to realize that
a lot of money is betting that
Japan will pay off its debt
t h rough conventional fiscal
policy. 
Is Japanese fiscal policy
sustainable? I need to begin by
addressing the question of what
we mean by fiscal sustainability.
Essentially, what we are talking
about when an economist dis-
cusses fiscal sustainability is
that we define a policy as sus-
tainable if it can continue
indefinitely with a stable gov-
ernment debt-to-GDP ratio. In
other words, the debt level may
rise over a certain time period,
but ultimately, will it come
back to its current level. 
The main finding, which
struck us as a very happy one,
was that Japan’s fiscal situation
is not nearly so bad if one
makes reasonable assumptions
about the future. Related to that
point, we argue that most stud-
ies that predict a crisis make
excessively pessimistic fore-
casts. Let me take you through
the few ways in which our
study differs from prior work.
There are five important dif-
ferences. The first is that when
people talk about the Japanese
government’s financial situa-
tion, very often they value the
financial assets held by the
Japanese government at zero.
Secondly, there tends to be an
assumption that low fertility in
Japan will continue forever.
Third, there is an assumption
that the long-term demo-
graphic transition, the aging of
the Japanese population,
needs to be solved with short-
t e rm policies. We believe that
some very long-term policies
may be more appro p r i a t e .
Fourth, one of the things that
we look at is that the transfers
to the old and the young
should depend on the popula-
tion of both groups. You will
see a lot of discussion about
the elderly and very little
about what needs to be done
for the young. Fifth, Japan
should be able to avoid some
explosive growth in per capita
benefits. If you let the per
capita benefits rise very rap-
idly, you may need some 
very high tax rates, but you
can also pursue somewhat
m o re fiscally conservative
a p p roaches. 
Why is the Japanese debt
level much less serious in our
opinion than is commonly
reported? The standard debt
number that one hears in pol-
icy debates is what economists
call “gross debt.” In accounting
t e rms, if you come from the
business world, it would be
the equivalent of your gro s s
liabilities. However, this makes
no adjustment for the asset
side of the balance sheet. Just
let me give you one example
of a big asset listed on the
Japanese balance sheet. Japan
holds US$824 billion worth of
f o reign exchange reserves, and
those assets re p resent a lot of
money, about 8 percent of the
U.S. GDP and 18 percent of
the Japanese GDP. Economists
like to work with a concept of
net debt, which is liabilities
less assets and is similar to net
worth for a corporation. If you
work with the net debt of the
Japanese government, you
realize that the net debt is less
than half of the gross debt. 
The second issue has to do
with population pro j e c t i o n s
that are used when fore c a s t i n g
social security payments. The
basic way social pensions
work in Japan is that the
younger generation of
Japanese pays for the older
generation. As we have seen,
the standard academic fore-
casts assume that the curre n t
Japanese fertility rate of 1.3
will continue fore v e r. That is
how the forecasts are done.
We just assume that there will
be no recovery in the Japanese
population. If you extrapolate,
the last Japanese person will
likely be born in 2800. If that
seems ridiculous, then you
should worry an awful lot
about pension forecasts that
a re being built on this fore c a s t .
In other words, surely, for the
last Japanese person born in
2800, the pension system is
going to be unsustainable. In
fact, you should realize that
the tax rate will eventually
become infinite if there is no
one left to pay taxes. Our
assumption is that the
Japanese are not going to dis-
appear and that the decline in
fertility is going to be tempo-
rary, because there are two
important effects on fertility.
The first effect is the one
commonly discussed, which is
that, as women’s wages rise,
they tend to have fewer chil-
d ren, because they would
rather go out and work and
e a rn money than stay home
with their children. The second
e ffect, which economists call
Japan’s fiscal situa-
tion is not nearly so






an “income effect,” is that if
women’s wages rise enough,
they can afford to have chil-
d ren. They can afford to pay
for nannies, or maybe they will
want to take some years off or
pursue some strategy so that
they can have children. The
second effect, in our estima-
tion, is likely to become more
important in several decades,
causing fertility to rise. You see
this internationally. Japan is
not a real outlier in terms of its
fertility rate, if one controls for
the income of the population.
As that income is likely to rise
in the next 20 or 30 years, fer-
tility is also likely to rise. 
I think it is important, also,
to realize that the problems
arising from long-term demo-
graphic transitions should be
dealt with via long-term poli-
cies. Japan is not going to be
aging forever. One can use
deficit financing to spread the
cost of aging over several gen-
erations. If you realize that
there is going to be a really bad
time, when there are a lot of
old people and very few young
ones, but that ultimately, the
population will stabilize, then
there are going to be some
population gains down the
road, as the ratio of elderly to
the younger population begins
to stabilize. You can use that to
help reduce the costs for the
current generation. 
Another difference between
our work and conventional
work is that we spend a lot of
time considering younger
Japanese. The standard fore-
casts spend a lot of time
thinking about how expendi-
tures on the elderly are going
to increase as the number of
elderly rise, but they make little
or no adjustment for the fact
that if you have fewer young
people in the future, then you
are going to have some cost
savings. With fewer young peo-
ple, you will need fewer
schools, lower social benefits
for the young, fewer police,
etc. These are cost offsets that
will come into play at some
point in the future and may
reduce some of the costs of the
aging society. 
The last set of assumptions
is that we assume modest eco-
nomic performance and some
cost containment in terms of
the rise in per capita benefits.
Very often, you will see in fore-
casts about sustainability that
future economic performance is
going to be even worse than
that of Japan over the last ten
years. It is a pretty bleak future
that is being forecast, and that
has implications for how much
you pay in taxes. In addition,
this is very often coupled with
extremely generous growth in
benefits, producing very high
tax rates. We find that modest
economic performance coupled
with generous, but not too gen-
erous, growth in benefits will
reduce the implied tax burden
substantially. 
Let me give you a sense of
what the next 100 years for
Japan is going to look like (see
Table C). The bottom line
shows government expendi-
tures or projected government
expenditures on the elderly as
a share of GDP over the next
100 years. You can see that this
is going to spike about 50 years
from now, as many people will
be retiring. On the other hand,
we project expenses on the
young to decline, because the
number of young people is
going decline in the future, so
some cost savings will occur. If
you look at total government
expenses, those are going to
continue to rise for about 10 
to 15 years, but then those
expenses will taper off a bit, as
the demographics start to stabi-
lize and older people start to
die off. 
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anese debt levels (Table D),
you are going to see in all of
our scenarios, rises in the debt
level over the next 50 years or
so. Depending on what tax rate
you use (here we are looking
at a tax rate that stabilizes the
debt level across the next 100
years), the debt level could rise
as much as a 160 percent of
GDP. This is net debt level from
a current level of about 70 per-
cent. A slightly higher tax rate
might keep the debt level
down to the level of Italy
today, and then it would come
down once the population 
stabilizes. 
With modest benefit
i n c reases (increasing benefits
roughly at the rate of real GDP
per capita benefits), the long
run, tax-to-GDP ratio needs to
rise by two percentage points
of GDP, or about 8 perc e n t ,
but there is no need for an
immediate tax increase. If the
economy grows well in the
next few years, it is conceiv-
able that the debt might be
sustainable without further tax
i n c reases. On the other hand,
if this fails, I would re c o m-
mend a phase into tax levels
close to those of 1990 over the
next 10 years. That, in our
baseline scenario, would solve
many of Japan’s pro blems. 
Is this feasible? I think it is,
because Japan currently has
among the lowest tax-to-GDP
ratios of any country in the
OECD; this is Japanese tax rev-
enues relative to GDP. In
particular, you can see it is
even lower than in the United
States, and much lower than
the average for the OECD and
certainly the average for
Europe. 
I think that Japan’s demo-
graphic transition is going to be
manageable. We analyze a
wide range of scenarios, includ-
ing the worst for the fiscal side,
with very generous benefits, no
recovery in fertility, and poor
economic performance; and if
that happens, Japan is going to
need European-level taxes.
They will then have European-
level benefits and European-
level taxes. On the other hand,
if you have generous benefits,
modest economic performance,
and a recovery in fertility,
Japan can get by with U.S.-level
tax rates (i.e., a slightly higher
tax rate in the future).
I do not know what Japan
is going to decide, but neither
of these options suggests a
major crisis in the future. As a
corollary, I think it is important
to recognize that monetary pol-
icy is not a solution to Japan’s
fiscal problem. The reason for
this comes from the fact that
the problem that Japan is facing
with an aging society is not
about current liabilities. It is not
that Japan has run up so much
debt that it cannot pay the
interest payments on it. It is
about future expenditures; that
Japanese society is aging, and
that Japan may have or will
have some big expenses in the
future. Inflation today is not
going to reduce future expendi-
tures, because it is all indexed
to the inflation rate. I think it is
unlikely that the Bank of Japan
is going to be forced to mone-
tize Japanese debt. 
D I S C U S S I O N
KAZUMASA IWATA
Bank of Japan
Let me make three points.First, looking at Japan’s cur-
rent fiscal management, it was
mentioned that maybe the pri-
mary surplus (deficit) should be
reduced to zero over 10 years,
and that has been the policy
advocated by Prime Minister
Koizumi. I would like to com-
pare the current situation with
the prediction. There is a sub-
stantial net debt ratio to the
nominal GDP, and that needs to
be stabilized. Second, I would
like to make a point about the
price level target that Professor
Ito mentioned. Third, I would
I think it is impor-
tant to recognize
that monetary policy
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like to share with you my per-
sonal viewpoint as to what
would constitute appropriate
monetary policy management. 
Professor Weinstein men-
tioned net debt and the GDP
ratio, the current level and the
likely rate in 100 years, and
that, if it is on the same level
going forward, then that situa-
tion can be regarded as being
sustainable. However, we will
need a large surplus; otherwise
this assumption may not be ful-
filled. Nominal GDP and net
debt need to be stabilized, and
the basic deficit must be
reduced to zero, and that has
been the policy of Prime
Minister Koizumi. 
Compared with the current
fiscal management of Prime
Minister Koizumi, I see that
Professor Weinstein looks for-
ward to having tighter policy
management fiscally. For exam-
ple, with reference to Koizumi’s
cabinet, in 2013, the net debt to
nominal GDP rate will become
rather high. There is a primary
budget deficit relative to GDP
of about 5 percent, so govern-
ment debt will rise, and there is
a deficit coming from interest
payment, servicing the debt, so
that there is a secondary
budget deficit. Combining these
two factors, the deficit will rise,
so that by 2013, the ratio
between net debt and nominal
GDP will be such that while it
might be 60 percent at present,
it would rise to 90 or even 100
percent.
Prime Minister Koizumi has
a policy to make the primary
deficit go down to zero. Even if
that is realized, however, if the
ratio of net debt to GDP is
high, making the deficit go
down to zero will not be suffi-
cient to have a stable ratio of
net debt to nominal GDP.
Initially, in talking about net
debt to nominal GDP, I think
Professor Weinstein said that
the initial number may not be
relevant, but with today’s cabi-
net, the net debt issue is
something that cannot be
ignored. We need to have a
certain level of surplus; other-
wise, we will not have a stable
net-debt-to-nominal-GDP-ratio
in the future. For example, if
the essential GDP budget
deficit is lowered by 10 per-
cent, even if it is to be lowered
by 5 percent, then maybe a sta-
ble situation will be achieved in
2015 or beyond. 
Professor Weinstein’s paper
mentions tax revenue, but if
you look at the breakdown of
tax revenue, you will see that
there is a tax revenue portion,
as well as social security contri-
butions. Those things are
covered together. In Japan, we
have a problem with the
national pension system, which
is faced with a crisis because
the younger generations are
refusing to pay the pension
premium, and there are mem-
bers of Parliament who also are
not paying into the pension
fund. The pension premium
collection has not been done
properly in Japan, so it has to
be replaced by a tax, which
means that there is a going to
be a heavier tax burden. 
As far as I am concerned,
looking at the public pension
system, I am of the view that it
needs to be privatized. If it is to
be privatized, then we need
¥450 trillion worth of money,
meaning that there is ¥450 tril-
lion worth of contingent
liability, which is on a par with
the nominal GDP. It would be a
challenging task to create a
good pension system, because
every year the benefits to be
paid would become huge.
If the level of the govern-
ment’s expenditure is to be
kept constant and stable, then
much needs to be done. There
is a fiscal expenditure on one
hand and a nominal GDP ratio
on the other—it needs to be
kept constant, and natural
growth of the tax ratio has
been expected, as has the auto-
matic stabilization effect. Even
in a recessionary period, this
automatic stabilization mecha-
nism has been relied on. If we
look, for example, at the social
security contributions, the pen-
sion system, or the medical
care system, we have to say
that those are the crucial points
to be considered when we talk
about the total picture of
Japanese public finance. 
There is one more point,
the tax and social security bur-
den. Combined, they are
regarded as being a burden on
the public. Presently, the defini-
tion of the national income is
used, and its burden is 35.5
percent; 40 percent is a social
security contribution, and 21.5
percent the tax portion.
According to Professor
Weinstein’s forecast, however,
with a generous payment bene-
fit, the ratio will be 43.9
percent, but it would become
54.4 percent or so, according to
the national income, which
goes beyond the threshold of
50 percent. 
Whether the birth rate will
recover or not is a crucial
point. With regard to the issue
of the birth rate, there is a pop-
ulation of women without
full-time jobs, called “freeters”
in Japan. They do not have
long-range plans, which means
The public pension




they are not likely to have chil-
dren. Over the long term,
looking at sustainability, we
need to have a subsidy, tax
incentive, or another method
that would promote regaining
the fertility rate. 
What about the utility
changes over time, together
with the demographic changes,
which have not been touched
on by Professor Weinstein? We
have an intergenerational
model, where, if we use an effi-
cient unit, the labor unit could
go up rather high, according to
my calculations.
What about price level tar-
geting and the monetary policy
aspect? In a long-standing,
deflationary economy, the
accommodating monetary pol-
icy needs to continue for a
longer time than normal. I
think Professor Weinstein’s rec-
ommendation is appropriate,
and, at the same time, when
the loss is incurred on the part
of the BoJ balance sheet, then
the Ministry of Finance has to
compensate for that, and I
think that is a very good sug-
gestion. However, if we look at
price level targeting, if we are
to open the Japanese deflation-
ary issue, can it be done only
relying on monetary policy, or
do we need help from fiscal
policy? Those are the issues
that need to be considered, and
there are a few camps on this.
There is a potential growth
rate, which could go down
temporarily. Under such cir-
cumstances, monetary policy
would be enough to deal with
that situation, so that the prob-
lem can be addressed with the
price level target. Professor
Weinstein’s paper is Ricardian,
and Prime Minister Koizumi’s
thought is Ricardian, too. But I
think Professor Weinstein rec-
ommends a much more
Ricardian type of policy. There
are multiple equilibrium points
that need to be considered
here. Monetary policy alone
will not be enough. Rather, a
stricter policy will be needed. 
Governor Bernanke of the
Federal Reserve Bank of New
York came to Japan last May,
and he asked what could be
done about deflation. Maybe
tax cuts, financed by money,
will be the key. A Ricardian fis-
cal policy has not been
mentioned, and on top of that,
a price level target could be
introduced. That was the rec-
ommendation made by
Bernanke. There are some
issues concerning price level
targets, which can be tempo-
rary; however, there is a danger
that they could diverge from
the final goal, which means that
credibility could be impaired in
managing the policy. Actually,
it is regarded as being behind
the curve. The inflation expec-
tation will go first, and the
monetary policy will be
delayed. 
My recommendations
include three principles. First,
the monetary base needs to
maintain positive growth into
the future. Second, fiscal target
policy should aim for a zero
primary deficit in about ten
years. Third, numerical price
stability targets need to be
introduced. Maybe we can call
this a “numerical expression” or
“reference rate”; this is the ref-
erence level in association with
the CPI. Then we will success-
fully escape deflation. Looking
at the fiscal target policy, if the
inflation rate is 1–2 percent,
then the Ricardian policy will
be applicable. However, there
is a natural interest rate and the
deflation rate, which are equal,
so under that circumstance, the
situation will warrant a non-
Ricardian type of approach. 
If we are to escape defla-
tion, then what would be the
essential point? Government
liabilities and the base money,
their summation, comprise out-
side assets, and those assets
need to be utilized to the
fullest. Under deflation, the
budget will remain unused, but
it needs to be used to the
fullest with reasonable assump-
tions about the variables; the
optimum effect will be roughly
8 percent. 
P rofessor Ito talked about
unconventional policy meas-
u res and tools. Many of the
unconventional tools are
a l ready being used on a de
facto basis. For example, the
Bank of Japan purchases JGBs
totaling ¥14 trillion, about 40
p e rcent of the budget deficit.
It has purchased shares held
by banks, with a prudential
ceiling of ¥3 trillion. However,
f o reign bond purchases are
constrained by the re s t r i c t i o n
that the Ministry of Finance
holds the responsibility for the
exchange rate.
Lastly, I would like to ask
about the issue of how we can
avoid overshooting the long-
term rate. As I said before, for
newly issued government
bonds, options have to be put
in so that there can be floating
bonds as well. 
There is a difference
between Governor Hayami and
Governor Fukui. Governor
Fukui has shown a clear, for-
ward-looking commitment,
Many of the uncon-
ventional tools are
already being used
on a de facto basis.
—Kazumasa Iwata
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which is a critical difference
from the past governor. I have
talked about price-level target-
ing as well as my proposition,
and there is a difference about
the element of dependence his-
torically. When it comes to
policy management, in
December 2003 three condi-
tions were set, and this is the
second condition, that the
majority of all of the board
members have to predict the
CPI increase rate of more than
zero, and it will never go back
to deflation. This needs to be
clarified further; maybe a 1 per-
cent positive increase rate of
CPI will be necessary to say
that normal reversion to the
CPI is zero. There is a 2 percent
ceiling rate and no overshoot-
ing. I think a clear message can
be sent in this fashion. 
SESSION II: REFORMS OF




Right now, it is very com-mon to look at the
recovery of the economy and
say that perhaps the financial
system problems are going to
go away. We think that is very
unlikely. Here is a very simple
calculation to suggest why just
a normal economic recovery
would be far from adequate to
cure the problems of the bank-
ing system. As of March 2003,
the period in which we last had
a full set of numbers, the bank-
ing system was severely
undercapitalized. Our rough
estimate is that the banking sys-
tem needs ¥35 trillion more
capital once you made all the
corrections needed to account
for hidden losses, underutilized
capital and underprovisioned
losses, deferred tax assets, and
the like. The question we start
with is whether or not the
recovery that has begun now in
Japan is likely to be enough on
its own to solve the problem. If
that were the case, then we
would not need big solutions
for the Japanese economy. 
We see that there are essen-
tially four ways that a recovery
could help the banking system.
One of them, which we have
already seen quite a bit of, is
recovery in the stock market.
Because the banks hold so
much in equities, roughly ¥20
trillion, they earn capital gains
every time the stock market
goes up, as well. As of March
2004, for instance, the Nikkei
was at 11,700, and at that point,
you would have had ¥4 trillion
in capital gains that would have
gone toward helping the capital
deficit. For every 10 percent
further that the stock market
recovers, you can get another
¥2 trillion. 
We made a crude adjust-
ment for the improvement in
loan quality that has happened
thus far, and by reducing the
number of nonperforming
loans and improving the quality
of the loans that are and stay
nonperforming, we estimate
that that would also reduce the
credit cost that the banks
would bear and that would add
another roughly ¥6 trillion. 
The problem is that that still
leaves you ¥25 trillion short,
and if you start asking how
much profitability would you
have to have to overcome that
deficit, the answer is, huge
amounts of profitability. If prof-
its were to grow at 40 percent
per year, which is almost crazy,
you could get five-year profit
totals of ¥16 trillion, and that
would then make usable some
deferred tax credits that we
think are not going to be
achievable to actually become
potentially usable. Add this up,
and you have about what it
would take to get the banking
system recapitalized. 
We do not think that this
scenario is at all realistic,
mostly because the profit fore-
cast is far too aggressive. The
40 percent profits per year
mean that by March 2008, you
would have profits in the bank-
ing system that are substantially
above the profits as of the peak
of the asset price bubble. You
would have to get profits to be
a third higher than they were in
March 1989 under this scenario.
It also assumes, magically, that
all of the bad lending decisions
that the banks have been mak-
ing for so long stop, so there is
no more lending to unworthy
companies. It also presumes
somehow that lending spreads
for the banks will rise, some-
thing that that data, even
through April, shows no sign of
happening so far. Right now
the banks’ lending margins are
no better than they were two
years ago. Finally, it ignores the
fact that the banks own a lot of
JGBs, and under this scenario,
when interest rates rise, a lot of
A normal economic
recovery would be
far from adequate to




the gains in the stock market
are cancelled by losses on the
bond holdings. The major
banks alone hold more than
¥100 trillion in bonds. The
duration is roughly four years
according to the reports that
we relied on, which means that
every 1 percent rise in interest
rates knocks ¥4 trillion of earn-
ings out for the banks. Our
conclusion is that merely sitting
on one’s hands and hoping for
the economy to recover will
not fix the banking problem.
A large part of our analysis
compares what has been done
in Japan to what has been done
elsewhere. Here, we rely
mostly on World Bank research,
where, examining 35 countries,
they have studied a number of
banking crises. In these 35
countries, there were three
prominent policies adopted.
One was to provide extensive
liquidity support for banks—
that has been done in Japan.
Second was to guarantee the
banks’ creditors, like the exten-
sion of deposit insurance that
began here in 1995 and has
continued for nine years. The
third involves the regulatory
forbearance that we see in
Japan, where lots of banks
have been permitted to operate
and then hastily closed when it
becomes painfully obvious that
they are not viable (interest-
ingly, there were audits done
by regulators very shortly
before many of these closures
where the auditors somehow
thought that they were viable).
In the 35 countries that have
had banking crises, 80 percent
of them used at least two of
these three policies. What the
people at the World Bank find
is that unfortunately these poli-
cies do not work, in two
specific senses. First, there is
no evidence that the countries
that adopted these polices
ended up with lower costs ulti-
mately for their taxpayers, nor
is there any evidence that the
speed at which the country
recovered from the banking cri-
sis was affected by using these
policies. We conclude that
these policies typically do not
work. Much of what we do in
the papers documents that
these policies have been in
place for a long time in Japan,
and thus far, have not worked
there. Based on the evidence
from other countries, it is not
surprising that things have not
improved in Japan. 
Let us now turn to an ana-
lysis of the lessons from
countries that have successfully
recovered. Here we focus on
Finland, Sweden, and the
United States, because these are
really the only developed,
advanced countries that have
had banking crises that were
systemic. Most of the countries
that have had really big bank-
ing problems in the last 20
years have been underdevel-
oped, and it is not clear that the
lessons learned there would
carry over to Japan. There are
two broad lessons that come
out of the experience of these
developed countries that we
think are very important. All
three of these countries used
asset management companies.
There is an alphabet soup of
names for the different asset
management companies that
have been tried in Japan. Right
now we have the IRCJ. The les-
son is that you have to try
something different from that
which has been tried in Japan.
In particular, those countries
that used their asset manage-
ment companies successfully
did something very different
from what has been tried in
Japan; they were very aggres-
sive about taking bad loans off
the books of financial institu-
tions, selling them, and doing
so quickly. For instance, in the
United States, 98 percent of the
savings and loan assets that
were transferred to the
Resolution Trust Corporation
were sold, and that was done
within five years. All three
countries had asset manage-
ment companies; all three of
them shut their asset manage-
ment companies down within
five years, and that was done
after the asset management
companies had disposed mas-
sively of the loans transferred
to them.
The second phenomenon
that occurred in all three coun-
tries was that the banking
industry shrank dramatically.
The savings and loan industry
in the United States over the
period around the crisis shrank
by 43 percent. Finland’s bank-
ing sector also shrank by a
third; that is something that
looks inevitable. In all of these
countries, as well, a great deal
of capital was injected into the
banking system, and the man-
agement of the banks was
replaced. We think that it is no
accident that so far the
Japanese financial system has
stagnated and been unable to
recover. Japan has been trying
policies that have not worked
elsewhere and avoiding the
policies that have been effec-
tive in other countries. 
For the banking crisis to be
resolved, Japan must move
away from the failed policies
and toward those that have a
Japan has been try-
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chance of working. We make
three specific recommenda-
tions. First, the FSA special
inspections that have begun
over the last year should be
extended and toughened up;
they should be available to all
types of borrowers, not just the
large borrowers at the large
banks—this must happen.
Second (this was a theme not
only in our paper, but nearly
half of the papers in the solu-
tions project), more focus on
restructuring must occur. We
cannot focus on labeling alone
but then do nothing about it.
That is evident in the successful
examples of recovery else-
where. Third, the banks that
should be recapitalized need to
be recapitalized sufficiently
once and for all, rather than in
a piecemeal fashion, as has
been done thus far. These
kinds of policy recommenda-
tions make no sense without a
coordinated macro policy to
strengthen the recovery even
further, so we assume here that
the macroeconomy has appro-
priate policies. We include a
detailed case study showing
that the way that Resona was
handled fails all of these pre-
scriptions, so even the recent
FSA performance, in that case
at least, looks inadequate. We
think that it is inevitable that
when the crisis ends, a number
of conditions will be met: the
banks will be better capitalized,
they will stop making loans to
nonperforming customers, and
the banking system, to be
viable, will be smaller and
more profitable.
We conclude that the cur-
rent polices have not worked,
and if you had asked us five
years ago, before we knew
what was going to happen, we
would have said there is no
basis for thinking that they
would work. We do not believe
that the macroeconomic
improvements thus far, or even
under any realistic scenario,
will be sufficient. We need to
see a much tougher, more
proactive set of polices for a
turnaround to take place in the
banking sector.
TAKEO HOSHI
University of California, San
Diego
Anil Kashyap has proposeda solution for the banking
sector, but the problem in the
Japanese financial system is not
limited to the banking sector.
The “Solutions” project that
Hugh and David and others
have been talking about and in
which we have participated,
has four other papers that deal
with the issues in the financial
system in Japan. There is one
paper by Professor Mitsuhiro
Fukao of Keio University on life
insurance companies and
another by Professor Mariko
Fujii on capital markets. There
is a paper by Professor Tokuo
Iwaisako of Hitotsubashi on
corporate restructuring and one
by Professor Takero Doi of
Keio University on government
financial institutions. I want to
go over the problems that gov-
ernment financial institutions in
Japan face and how we should
solve them. This is based on
the paper in the “Solutions”
project done by Professor Doi.
I also wrote a paper with
Professor Doi a couple of years
ago, which was published last
year, about FILP—the Fiscal
Investment and Loan Program,
Zaito in Japanese. 
By government financial
institutions (GFI), or s e i-
f u k e i k i n y u k i k a n , we mean all
the government financial insti-
tutions listed in Table E. These
g o v e rnment financial institu-
The FSA special
inspections that have
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tions are an important part of
the FILP. As many of you
know, FILP is a program that
the Japanese government has
to allocate investment and
loans, using the funds col-
lected through govern m e n t
financial institutions. FILP may
have been important for eco-
nomic growth in Japan before
the Japanese economy
m a t u red. For example, before
the Japanese government ran
a budget deficit, FILP was a
useful tool for the govern m e n t
to finance large projects with-
out raising taxes at the same
time. Even after the Japanese
g o v e rnment started to run a
budget deficit and finance it
by issuing government bonds,
but before the bond market
was well developed, FILP was
useful because it allowed the
Japanese government to
finance government bonds
using the money collected
t h rough postal savings. As the
economy matured, private
financial markets developed,
and many factors that made
GFIs and FILP itself have dis-
a p p e a red. Many govern m e n t
financial institutions started to
cause problems. 
I would like to point out
t h ree important problems that
many GFIs have. One is that
the government financial insti-
tution may distort competition
in the financial market by 
competing with the private
financial institutions on an
unfair basis. After all, the gov-
e rnment financial institutions
do not pay taxes, and they
receive subsidies. From the
private sector’s point of view,
that is not good. If you are a
private bank or financial insti-
tution, you would not want to
compete with a bigger finan-
cial institution that does not
pay taxes and is subsidized 
by the government. Second,
even if government financial
institutions do not distort com-
petition directly and engage in
some useful activities, they
may keep losing money,
which eventually costs the 
taxpayers. Third, if the govern-
ment financial institution does
not lose money and engages in
something useful, we can still
ask whether it is really best to
use GFIs. 
G o v e rnment financial insti-
tutions are not an insignificant
phenomenon. There are two
observations we can make.
One, they are big—the postal
savings are more than 30 per-
cent of total deposits, and the
g o v e rnment financial institu-
tions collectively make more
than 20 percent of total loans.
Two, they grow over time. If
you compare the numbers for
1990 to those for 2002, the
g o v e rnment financial institu-
tions, both postal savings and
other government financial
institutions, increased their
s h a res. We are talking about a
big part of the financial sys-
tem, and it has some big
p roblems. 
My paper with Takero Doi
shows an estimate of the cost
to taxpayers in covering the
losses that were already made
by the FILP agencies—all of
those government agencies and
special public companies that
receive money from the FILP
and the government financial
institutions are a big part of this
FILP. Our estimates show that
the cost to bail out the Fiscal
Investment and Loan Program
is ¥78 trillion or ¥620,000 for
every person alive today in
Japan.
What should be done? We
propose that for each govern-
ment financial institution, first
we need to isolate the problem.
If the problem is that the gov-
ernment financial institution
distorts competition in the
financial market, it is important
to remove the distortion. In
some cases, we may be able to
make the government financial
institution compete with private
financial institutions on an
equal footing by taxing it or
cutting its subsidies. In some
cases, we may conclude that
we do not really need certain
government financial institu-
tions, because private financial
markets have developed suffi-
ciently. In that case, the
government financial institu-
tions have completed their
mission, and we can close them
down. If a government finan-
cial institution still has a role to
play in the economy, but the
problem is that the government
financial institution has been
losing money, then we need to
determine exactly how much
money the government finan-
cial institution is losing. Then,
we need to evaluate whether
the need the government finan-
cial institution is filling is really
worth the cost. 
Economists can give you
the numbers, but eventually,
whether a government financial
institution should continue
should be decided by the
Japanese voters. If we decide
our government institution is
doing something worthwhile
and not losing money, then the
question we should ask is, “Is
the government financial insti-
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address the policy goal?” For
example, the Government
Housing Loan Corporation may
be doing something very useful
to encourage home ownership,
but is giving subsidized loans
the best answer? One alter-
native is to subsidize the
homebuyer directly, which may
be a less costly way to achieve
the same goal.
To be fair, I should point
out that the Japanese govern-
ment recognizes the problems,
but given what the government
has been doing, we must con-
clude that it does not have the
final solutions yet. The FILP
reforms, the reform of Zaito,
was introduced in April 2001,
and we can consider that an
attempt to introduce market
discipline for FILP agencies,
including government financial
institutions. So far, however, lit-
tle change can be observed.
The FILP agencies are required
to issue FILP agency bonds
eventually, according to the
plan. For now, however, only a
small amount of FILP agency
bonds have been issued in the
market. The flow of funds
between the government finan-
cial institutions and the postal
savings has not changed very
much. 
The Koizumi government
also decided on a plan for reor-
ganization and reunification of
special public corporations, or
tokushuhojin kaikaku. Initially,
study for the plan was to be
completed by the end of 2002.
It did not happen. Now, the
study is to be completed by the
end of 2004. Here, we again
see takinobashi, or procrastina-
tion by the government. 
The government re a l i z e s
the problem of postal savings,
and in September 2002, the
council issued the final re p o r t
on the future modalities of 
the three postal businesses.
This final report talks about
the potential models for 
f u t u re postal savings in Japan
but does not contain final 
conclusions. 
There are general principles
we need to keep in mind when
we come up with solutions for
the problems of the govern-
ment financial institutions.
These principles are: 
1. The government financial
institutions should not distort
competition in the financial
markets.
2. The government financial
institutions’ activities should
be worth the cost, and it is
the Japanese voters who
need to make that decision,
for each government finan-
cial institution.
3. Having government financial
institutions must be the most
efficient answer for the pol-
icy goal that the government
financial institutions are
designed to achieve. 
D I S C U S S I O N
MAKOTO HOSOMI
Financial Services Agency
As far as we are concernedwith regard to macroeco-
nomic growth, growth itself will
not be a solution to the NPL or
the banking sector issue. In
October 2002, the financial
revitalization program was
announced; it called for the
strict assessment of assets and
injection of public funds to
recapitalize some institutions.
And, of course, corporate gov-
ernance on part of the bank
would be looked at as well. We
are not working on the basis of
the economic recovery,
because economic recovery
alone will not be the solution. 
There was a comment
made about the special inspec-
tion by FSA. There might be
some misunderstanding here.
There are both the standard
type of inspection and the spe-
cial inspection, but there is no
difference in terns of the tough-
ness of the examination given
to the asset. In the case of a
normal inspection, based on
certain standard figures on an
ex post basis, the FSA will con-
duct an inspection. But in the
case of a special inspection,
prior to the closing of the
account with regard to the
major borrowers of that major
bank, inclusive of the financial
institutions,  the auditing, and
the FSA, all will get together to
look at the borrower’s situation,
whether there has been down-
grading of the rating of the
major borrower over the six-
month period or whether there
has been a significant decline
of the stock prices by some of
the major borrowers. Those
need to be reflected duly in
time in the closing of the
account. That is why, before
closing the account, we go into
the bank and conduct a special
inspection. It is a difference of
timing—ex post or prior to the
events. We focus on the major
points for special inspections.
Every year we conduct a nor-
mal inspection of the major
banks, and the standard
applied there is as tough as that
we employ for the special
inspection. 
It may not be the official
stance of the FSA, but let me
share with you the problems
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faced by Japanese banks as I
see them. There are the issues
of corporate governance and
stocks and flows of assets.
What we are focusing on inten-
sively is the quality
improvement of the stock
assets. How can we improve
loan quality? Of course,
Japanese banks have a lot of
stock holdings, and the capital
gain has been going up for
these stocks, but I think that by
holding too much stock,  the
banks can cause their stability
to fluctuate. We have a policy
that the banks’ shareholding be
within the tier one asset. Even
if Nikkei 225 fluctuates by 10
percent, its impact on the
banks’ capital will be less as a
result of those policies. 
The second point is the
nonperforming loan (NPL)
issue, in association with the
quality of loan issue. As you
know, a financial reconstruc-
tion program was put in place.
The NPL ratio of 8.4 percent
needs to be halved by March
2005; two years have passed,
and it has come down to 5.2
percent from the previous 8.4
percent. So the goal is to have
the ratio about 4 percent. It is
progressing as scheduled, but
there is some unevenness from
one bank to another. Some
banks have already achieved
going below the 4 percent fig-
ure, but there are some who
are still hovering at around 8
percent. 
As for loans, action has
been taken to deal with the
“doubtful” categorization and
those below it. Within one
year of the emergence of such
a loan, 50 percent has to go
o ff the balance sheet, and in
t h ree years, it must be off - b a l-
anced fully. In this area, there
is no “everg reening” (a situa-
tion in which banks are ro l l i n g
over loans to de facto bank-
rupt firms). For the “need
special attention” category of
substandard loan, with re g a r d
to those types of the loans,
beginning in March 2003, these
have been on the incre a s e .
H o w e v e r, unlike the “doubtful”
or “substandard” categories,
they have a certain room for
being viable, but NPLs still
need to be disposed of in this
category. With regard to the
n o rmal type of business, the
revitalization plan has to be
written and formulated, and
the FSA will take a close look
at it. We have noted that there
is a polarization taking place
between those that are
i m p roving and those that are
not. By looking at the re v i t a l-
ization program, we can judge
which companies are doing
better and which are doing
worse; I think this latter cate-
gory of loan has been on the
d e c rease. The “need special
attention” category of loans
could also be looked at as
well. We are checking on them
and can judge whether or not
the revitalization program has
p ro g ressed smoothly.
Thanks to the economic
recovery, the emergence of
new NPLs has been on the
decline. Since October 2002,
the discount cash flow method
has been employed for calcu-
lating the provisioning, and for
the past year, provisioning lev-
els have been going up. The
figures I have say that collat-
eral, real estate, and so forth is
85 percent for the “doubtful”
category. For the ”substandard,”
a little more than 60 percent
provisioning has been secured.
Of course, one can say any-
thing about the appropriate
levels of provisioning, but com-
pared with three years ago, it
has been on the rise. 
The second stock issue is
the quality of the capital. Apart
from the public fund injection,
let me focus on the deferred
tax asset (DTA) issue. Of
course, there are a lot of DTAs.
I do not think it is desirable to
have such a situation; last year,
the Financial System Council
report also said that. It is desir-
able to s the DTAs continue to
decline. Why has the DTA issue
emerged in Japan? In accor-
dance with the Japanese
system, there is a big difference
between taxation and account-
ing. When much progress is
made in NPL disposal, then the
DTAs will also go up as well.
However, if the NPL disposal
goes down, then DTAs will go
down as well.
The peak of the NPL was
8.4 percent in March 2002, but
the DTA peak registered one
year after, in March of last year,
and has started to decline.
However, DTA is an accounting
notion. Whether it can be rec-
ognized as capital within the
regulatory framework is
another question, and it has
been discussed at the Financial
System Council deliberations.
After the intensive disposal
period of NPL is over next year,
it will be considered more fully.
Much effort has been made to
improve asset quality, and I
think we have become more
ready to address seriously the
issue of the quality of the 
capital. 
Asset flow is not a matter
for the administration to
a d d ress, but rather one to be
As for loans, action
has been taken to
deal with the “doubt-
ful” categorization
and those below it.
—Makoto Hosomi
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resolved by the management
of the banks, but let me make
a few points. First, in the case
of Japan, with ¥4 trillion worth
of core business operating
p rofit being obtained by the
major banks in Japan, com-
p a red with asset size,
p rofitability is rather low.
Japanese financial institutions
have produced a deficit
because the credit cost was
higher than the net operating
p rofit earned from the core
business. Now, however, I
think the structure has become
ready to yield some pro f i t .
Second, there is a low marg i n
issue—low, narrow spread. I
would like to point out, how-
e v e r, that at least at this
j u n c t u re, deflation is still con-
tinuing. There is a zero
p e rcent deposit rate. Yet, the
real interest rate is very high
in Japan. If the short-term
rates still go up, then it is usu-
ally the case that the deposit
rate, as well as the lending
rate, will also go up. What will
become of the spread? Will the
s p read be widened or kept as
it is? We will have to see
whether the spread impro v e s
or not in the short-term - r a t e -
rising situation. 
It has been mentioned that
the business line of Japanese
banks is rather backward,
which may be is true to a cer-
tain extent. Japanese banks are
trying to improve their fee busi-
ness, and corporate banking is
on the decrease, so that SME
loans, consumer loans, and
mortgage loans are rising
instead. Government financial
institutions will need to be
reconsidered. Particularly with
regard to housing loans, the
business of the government-
operated Housing Loan
Corporation is being curtailed;
it will be  taken over by the pri-
vate sector banks. 
The administration can con-
tribute to improving the
profitability of the banks. For
example, we can focus on the
branch network function of the
banks. Through the branches,
we hope that more products
can be handled by banks like
OTC sales of insurance prod-
ucts and mutual fund products
and so on. The notion of one-
stop banking can come to the
fore, and more branches can be
utilized for this purpose. That
would contribute to the im-
provement of the profitability
of banks in Japan. 
The current management of
financial institutions has to be
fully responsible for internal
compliance, and the decisions
that they made have to be
implemented in a responsible
way. I have only talked about
the major banks in Japan, but
regional financial institutions
were discussed in the recent
IMF report. Maybe we have not
been tough enough. Because of
the notion of relationship-based
banking, the numerical target
has not been imposed on
regional banks, because the
regional economy and regional
financial institutions need to
recover in an integrated man-
ner. Some have thought that
the stance we have taken has
been too soft, but looking at
the NPL ratio as of March this
year, we see that an improve-
ment of 1 percent has been
attained. I think regional finan-
cial institutions are addressing
the issue much more properly
than has been expected. Also,
in some cases of the ratings
given to the regional financial
institutions have been
upgraded. 
With regard to the regional
local financial institutions, we
often hear of the “overbanking”
of Japan. Roughly speaking,
back in 1991, we had more
than 1,000 deposit taking insti-
tutions, but now there are
620—a drop of 40 percent or
so. What is at issue—supply
and demand issue or the mere
number of the financial institu-
tions? Or is it the overall size of
the financial institutions? What
about the total number of
financial institutions in exis-
tence in Japan? The number has
been declining, as I have said.
Also, in the new framework for
injecting public capital, we are
seeing that the consolidation of
local regional financial institu-
tions is being promoted. 
The size of the financial
institutions might become
smaller, but Japanese banks
have been curtailing their lend-
ing, while deposits have been
on the rise, so asset size itself
has not changed much.
Japanese households are the
providers of funds, but more
than 50 percent of the funds
are being kept in the postal
savings. The financial institu-
tions have traditionally lent the
money to the businesses.
Unlike other countries, credit
risk transfer or securitization
has not been relevant, and
banks have held onto their
loans to their fullest maturity.
The simplest funds have been
provided by the household sec-
tor to finance the lending  by
banks to businesses in Japan. 
We hope that more money
will flow from deposits and
savings to investment. Instead
of the financial institutions tak-
The current manage-
ment of financial




that they made have




ing on fully the risk involved in
companies, we hope that
through the capital markets,
households will also be risk-
takers, to a certain extent,
through investment. It would
be desirable to see some
money channeled into other
purposes, for direct investment
and so forth. It is likely and fea-




there was mention of the large
holdings of Japanese banks of
Japanese government bonds. I
think the number cited was
¥100 trillion, but I think for
major banks, that figure should
have been ¥60 trillion. Of
course, equity holding on the
part of banks has been declin-
ing. If you apply a simple
sensitivity test, flat equity will
go down by 10 percent, and
the interest rate will go up by
100 basis points; the interest
rise of 100 basis points would
have a bigger effect. However,
the JGBs holding is quite liquid,
so the portfolio can be rebal-
anced in accordance with
changes in the interest rate, and
there are many hedging tools
available as well. In May 2003,
the ten-year yield on the JGBs
was less than 0.5 percent, but it
went up to 1.5 percent around
March of this year, a rise of 100
basis points. Financial institu-
tions did not suffer serious
damage, because hedging had
been done in advance, for
example. The FSA, on a
monthly basis, checks the
financial institution’s portfolio
and risks, and if there is a prob-
lem, early warnings are issued
by the FSA. We are looking into




The Japan National Railways(JNR) was privatized ear-
lier, and it is often compared
with the future privatization of
postal savings. However, these
two public companies are in
very different environments.
JNR was in deficit over many
years and labor disputes went
on frequently. There was a
national consensus, including
60 percent of the general public
and news media, to privatize
JNR. On the other hand, postal
savings and postal life insur-
ances are not in deficit. Only
mail service is. Postal masters
in rural areas are often believed
to be helping local politicians
in elections. Many people in
rural areas use post offices for
convenience and for safety rea-
sons. They see  few costs that
government ownership of post
offices creates.
However, the general pub-
lic should be aware of the
implicit costs of the post office
system. For example, there are
no taxes, there are no fees for
deposit insurance, and there
are hidden costs for misalloca-
tion of funds. A cost analysis
would have to be done to
show how costly it is for the
post office to be under govern-
ment control.
Certainly, it would be better
to change the post office from
being under government con-
trol to private ownership.
However, some issues would
remain. For example, how to
maintain rural post offices,
where costs are higher than in
the urban areas? Since postal
workers are government
employees, how can their num-
bers be reduced?
If post offices start lending
activities after privatization, it
would further increase compe-
tition among banks and would
increase bank failures in rural
areas. 
My proposal under the
Koizumi Reform (I am a mem-
ber of the Reform Committee)
is that post offices can only
accept ordinary deposits and
stop accepting time deposits
(teigaku). Post offices could
become sales agents for the
financial products of private fin-
ancial institutions. All the
financial products of private
financial institutions, which
include stocks, bonds, and
mutual funds, can be sold
through post offices. The very
popular teigaku deposit is simi-
lar to JGBs, so it can be a
substitute.
Postal savings should work
as a narrow bank, which pur-
chases only government bonds
rather than making loans.
However, narrow banks have
failed in the past. When the
share prices start to rise, many
depositors shift their deposits
from narrow bank stocks,
which makes it difficult for nar-
row banks to continue. Losses
have been reported. If they
cannot compete; narrow banks
should close.
In the past ten years, there
were 180 bank failures in
Japan. One of the reasons for
bank failure is due to regional
distress. Regional banks, credit
cooperatives, etc. are mainly
lending money in their own
regions or prefectures. Regional
problems have occurred, such
as a decline in tourists or the
decline in number of factories
due to their shift to China.
Another reason is the lack
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of management quality of small
banks. Some of the shinkin
banks and credit cooperatives
are still competing in terms of
scale or size, rather than profits. 
Banks are competing to
lend money to good customers,
so  their profit margins decline
sharply. On the other hand,
banks do not want to lend
money to risky borrowers.
When the Japanese economy
was growing and banks were
protected by regulations, the
number of banks was low.
However, the regulations were
diminished and the economy
started to shrink; therefore, the
overbanking issue arises.
The failure by the Ministry
of Finance was not being able
to make a smooth exit policy.
Therefore, many weak banks
remained alive. It is also related
to the limited guarantee of
deposits, which was not imple-
mented due to the opposition
of those politicians who
wanted to keep small banks in
their own region.
The solution would be to
return to the limited guarantee
of deposits from April 2005 as
is planned and make the clo-
sure of weak banks go more
smoothly.
During the high growth
period, clear objectives were
set by bankers. It was to
increase their deposits and
loans. They were competing
mainly in terms of scale
Recently many small banks
cannot set up their objectives
clearly.
One of the bad incentives is
the structure of commissions
and fees. Banks started to sell
mutual funds at their branch
offices. Each mutual fund pays
different commissions to the
branch. Then bankers at each
branch office sell the mutual
funds that they can earn high
commissions from, rather than
examining carefully how each
mutual fund is attractive to cus-
tomers. A good incentive
mechanism should be set up so
that customers’ needs and the
commissions are matched to
each other.
Many banks are seeking
similar objectives rather than
their own direction. Japanese
banks earn profits mainly from
interest income rather than
from loans, and income from
fees and commissions are
small.
Japanese banks invest their
money mainly in Japan, rather
than investing abroad. Japanese
banks expanded their operation
to overseas during the 1980s,
primarily to support strong
Japanese manufacturing indus-
tries. They could not start new
overseas business by them-
selves. They looked very strong
mainly because Japanese man-
ufacturing firms, such as
automobile and television,
were making profits. Now they
need their own strategy, such
as seeking new business in
Asia.
Many Japanese banks
increased mortgage loans to
customers since business loans
declined sharply. However,
mortgage loans might become
risky. Land prices are still
falling, and disposable income
is declining in Japan.
Japanese banks might make
the same mistake as they did in
the late 1980s, following what
their rivals are doing.
Japanese banks
might make the same
mistake as they did
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